independent members. Arguments exist for either side on whether the committee should be entirely independent to avoid bias or to have some non-independent members to ensure adequate functioning. One issue that results from having an overly independent committee are is in actually determining remuneration of directors: ensure a correlation between compensation and performance by understanding the functioning of the corporation. Furthermore, another issue linked to independence is the term timing between the remuneration committee and other corporate bodies-corporations must avoid restricting their committee to merely ratifying past decisions given this lag in timing.
It is important to understand these issues as international regulations continue to develop and evolve within the next few months and years. W hile some jurisdictions are headed in the right direction, some regulations might be impeding on the effectiveness of remuneration committees, contrary to their ultimate goal. § 1.º Introduction 1. The remuneration committee's role in the corporate governance system I -The acknowledged significance of remuneration committees (also referred to as "compensation committees") is increasing, especially given the recent development of literature about corporate governance on corporations and the intense flow of regulatory and recommendatory measures adopted during the last decades, recently intensified as a reaction to the international financial crisis.
The formation of remuneration committees is a manifestation of a process of recognition regarding the value of specialized committees in the corporate context. These committees promote a division of tasks and responsibilities between corporate players and, in this matter specifically, they allow a more professional and informed treatment regarding complex subjects 1 .
Moreover, there are specific qualities relating to the remuneration committee that merit being mentioned. On the one hand, this type of committee promotes, in a decisive manner, the rigor and transparency of the remuneration setting process, given the segregation of the management function and the remuneration setting function, thus facilitating an adequate resolution of conflicts of interests 2 . On the other hand, the remuneration committee may convene people that are qualified to ensure a more specialized treatment of these subjects -therefore responding to the increasing sophistication of regulation applied to remuneration and remuneration structures.
As a result, it is justified to devote attention ex professo to this concept, and the following pages are set to do just so.
Recent regulatory evolution
I -The regulatory evolution regarding remuneration committees reflects the general trends of corporate governance regulatory sources, mainly in the last decades. Initially, regarding remuneration committees, there is a visible influence of "soft law", in particular of corporate governance codes 3 . However, recently, there has been a noticeable amount of more concrete regulations that deal with these committees: in the United States and in Europe, remuneration committees were heretofore recommended, and now they are increasingly the subject of mandatory formation under legal and regulatory requirements. came to be applied to some U.S. corporations, under the controversial claim that it only represented an update of remuneration conditions before unforeseeable market developments 5 . The problems that arose from this price change were considered relevant 6 , as it was recognized that it would undermine and impair the structure of incentives behind stock option plans 7 . The second wave of regulatory interventions regarding remuneration committees represented a reaction to the financial crisis initiated in 2007, in particular because, in many financial institutions, inadequate remuneration structures were detected, with a high level of importance given to short-term performance and inducing excessive risk taking 8 .
One point should be emphasized: if the reaction to the scandals in the beginning of the 21 st century resulted in the need to strengthen the supervision bodies of corporations (in any governance models), the financial crisis initiated in 2007 led the corporate governance debate to focus on the need to perfect the process of remuneration setting. However, whereas the regulatory interventions at the start of the new millennium focused on corporations, this time the regulatory responses mainly (but not exclusively) targeted financial institutions, as we will demonstrate in the following analysis.
II -The revaluation of remuneration committees has been significant in the context of recent regulatory developments.
In the US, after some recommendatory interventions 9 , in 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission established a requirement regarding the need to prepare a report concerning the remuneration structure of corporations, as to present annual information about the rationale of paid remuneration and its relation to corporate performance 10 . The statute established the regulatory acknowledgment of the functions to be performed by the remuneration committee, which had the task to formulate said report, signed by all respective members -although the SEC In the United Kingdom, the treatment given to remuneration committees focused, at an early stage, on recommendations. The precursor Cadbury Report of 1992 already recommended to corporations the formation of remuneration committees fully or mostly composed by non-executive directors 15 . Further development regarding remuneration themes were brought by the Greenbury Report (1995) which resumed and developed the recommendations of the Cadbury Report 16 . This document was the product of a workgroup exclusively focused on remuneration issues, and dedicated an entire section to remuneration committees. The most relevant aspects that were added related to the internal regulation of the committee, the requirements applied to its member and the support to be provided for it in order to function efficiently. that are significant in terms of their size, or the size of the funds they manage, or internal structure and the nature and complexity of their activities 32 . It is expected that this solution will be extended to harmonize investment funds in transferable securities and to insurance companies, giving the content of the directives whose preparation is underway in these areas.
IV -In Portugal, it is also patent the increasing of regulatory and recommendatory interventions regarding remuneration committees. Apart from articles 399 and 429 of the Portuguese Companies Act, establishing, in general terms, the committee, the Law n. 28/2009, of June 19th, states that the remuneration committee or the board of directors should annually submit a statement concerning the remuneration policy to the shareholders general meeting. These regulatory elements will be analyzed later on 33 The members of these remuneration committees are mostly or exclusively, depending on jurisdictions, independent directors 36 . This option is adopted by the United Kingdom 37 ; in the US, it is frequently the inclusion of independent members exclusively 38 ; in France, however, it is considered sufficient the presence of a majority of independent members 39 .
Equally relevant is noticing that these committees, in some legal systems, take on decision functions (as in the case of the United Kingdom 40 ), whereas other countries prefer to confer them the role of presenting proposals on remuneration matters, where the final decision belongs to the board of directors. This is the case in France 41 and Italy 42 .
This structural model of the remuneration committees is so widely spread that, sometimes, it is represented as the only one in international texts (e.g. European) and legal literature; which, as we will demonstrate, is Anglo-centric and incorrect.
III -The dualistic model of governance, which combines the existence of an executive board of directors and a general and supervisory board 43 Regarding the dualistic model, the responsibility on this matter lies with the general and supervisory board or with a committee appointed by this body, or, in the cases that the company's contract allows it, with the general meeting or a committee appointed by that body.
VI -It is important to underline that the Portuguese legal system distinguishes itself in allowing the creation of a remuneration committee in any given corporation, irrespective of activity, size, shareholder structure or share price. This aspect constitutes a remarkable difference when compared to other legal systems that only deal with listed companies or credit institutions regarding the creation of a remuneration committee.
Unity or plurality
The law does not forbid the creation of more than one remuneration committee within the same company, and, in reality, some Portuguese companies have done so. This possibility is particularly relevant when the company seeks to form separate remuneration committees, one that deals with directors' remuneration and the other with the members of other corporate bodies.
Similarly, in the dualistic model, the following may coexist: the remuneration committee delegated by the general and supervisory board, which settles the remuneration of the members of the executive board of directors, and a remuneration committee delegated by the shareholders general meeting, which is responsible to set the remuneration of members of other corporate bodies. 
Organization and legal duties of its members
I -The law does not establish rules regarding the organization of these committees. As in any corporate structure, recommendations usually include the existence of internal regulations, periodically reviewed, and minutes of meetings, to ensure its effectiveness.
The remuneration committee may not be established in the company's by-laws.
Indeed, in the classical and Anglo-Saxon models, the law considers a nomination resolution to be sufficient (article 399 of the Portuguese Companies Act). On the contrary, the need to establish, in the by-laws of the company, the remuneration committee, is required in the dualistic model regarding directors' remuneration, when that function is allocated to a committee appointed by the general meeting (article 429 of the Portuguese Companies Act). 48 See infra, 7.
However -and without diminishing the role of internal regulations of these committees -given the relevance of remuneration matters, it is considered a manifestation of good governance practices that the existence of remuneration committees should be included in the company's statutes irrespective of the governance model. II -From the moments of their appointment, the committee's members are subject to the legal duties connected to the functions to be performed. Among those duties, it is included: the duty to set the remuneration of the members of corporate bodies; the duty to establish the remuneration policy and to periodically review it; the duty to oversee the information provided by the company regarding remuneration; and the duty to provide information -to the supervisory board and, when necessary, to the shareholders general meeting -about the activities of the committee 49 .
In the United States, in addition to these aforementioned duties, the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the committee be given adequate resources to perform the exclusive duty to hire and oversee the work of advisors such as compensation consultants, legal counsel and others 50 .
In spite of not being expressly stated ex lege, the members of the remuneration committee are subject to general duties of loyalty and care. Regarding the duties of loyalty, it is important to note that the recent Directive n. 2010/76/UE, of November the 24 th 2010, focusing on credit institutions and investment companies, states that the remuneration committee should take into account the long term interests of the shareholders, investors and other stakeholders 51 .
As a direct consequence of the duty of care, one should mention the duty of gathering information that all members of the remuneration committee are subject to, in conjunction with corporate structures, the other bodies and existent corporate committees. The issue is the need to acquire sufficient knowledge over III -The only way to ensure an adequate functioning of this body is to provide an adequate functional cooperation within the company.
Said cooperation does not undermine the attributions allocated to the remuneration committee. This collaboration is essential in two fundamental stages: in the preparation of the decisions of the remuneration committee; and in their execution. In both stages the inter-company collaboration is due in order to achieve an adequate functioning of that committee.
In short, it seems safe to conjecture that the independence of the remuneration committee does not result on self-sufficiency on remuneration matters 58 . On the contrary: the independence and composition of the committee suggest a functional dependence to other company structures. This is not to say that the support coming from other structures leads to the impairment of the attributions of the remuneration committee -a result the law does not allow. IV -The companies legal regime accepts that part of the remuneration of the directors may be a percentage of the company's net income (article 399.º, n.2).
Moreover, it mandates that the maximum percentage of the company's net income to be used with that purpose should be established in the company's contract.
The law does not elaborate on how the directors' remuneration and the performance evaluation will interconnect.
For the purposes of this analysis, it is not relevant to examine if the mentioned legal absence is or is not unwelcome -i.e., whether this loophole should have been addressed by legal requirements or recommendations 59 It is important to underline that this is not a secondary issue, in the sense that one of the main goals of directors' remuneration is precisely to provide adequate incentives to promote the optimization of the executive directors' performance 61 .
The dynamic provided by the remuneration linked to performance (pay-forperformance) may constitute a powerful governance instrument, in the way that it strengthens the alignment of interests between the executive director 62 and the company, promoting the creation of value 63 .
Also, in quantity terms, the remuneration's variable component of directors is usually important. According to data from 2006, the variable component was, on average, 47,4% of the total remuneration of listed companies 64 .
For clarifying purposes of questions related to variable remuneration, it is not sufficient to generally state, as Portuguese law does 65 , that part of the net income of the company may be allocated to the remuneration of directors.
To illustrate this issue, there are complex problems behind the selection of performance criteria 66 , or, in the case of stock options, their structure 67 or the setting of the exercise price 68 . Likewise, the allocation of the variable bonus to the members of the board of directors involves certain knowledge of the company that usually evades the remuneration committee. The adequate design of the variable remuneration should equally counteract the risk of unlawful use of privileged information and the establishment of a short-term vision by the board of directors 69 .
Regarding the Portuguese legal system, this issue affirms in irrefutable terms, again, the need of collaboration between the remuneration committee and other company's structures 70 .
It should not be asked of a delegated body, which is recommended to be composed of independent members of the administration, to be able, by itself, to establish the criteria for the allocation of the global amount.
A solution to this problem would be to promote a change of the recommendations in force, so that the remuneration committee may include a non-independent member.
Portuguese recommendations follow the British example where it advocates the inclusion of only independent members. In many recommendatory texts, however, it is considered sufficient that the remuneration committee may be composed by a majority of independent member (for example in Spain 71 It is clear that, in the legal context, the remuneration committee has the power to confirm or change the remuneration conditions previously adjusted 73 . As established by the Supreme Court, the remuneration settled by non-competent bodies is invalid 74 . However, the issue here is addressed in a purely functional perspective -taking into consideration the recommendation of MICHAEL JENSEN in that remuneration committees must take full control of the remuneration process, policies, and practices 75 . Therefore, in this context, it is impoverishing to the vocation of the remuneration committee to restrict their role to ratifying decisions made by others.
On the one hand, the solution could be found in a link of continuity between the composition of the new remuneration committee and its predecessor, through the keeping in function of at least one member of the committee. However, this is a committee appointed by the general meeting and the imposition of a member may not be feasible (mainly in situations of transition of domain). Worst odds would have the creation of a term lag between each member of the committee -given the inconvenience generally accepted regarding staggered boards 76 .
It seems a lag would be advantageous between the start of the exercise of functions of the remuneration committee and the board of directors. It would reinforce the role of the remuneration committee in preparation of new remuneration packages of future members of the company's bodies, and it would increase its de facto independence.
Therefore, the time lag between the term of the members of the remuneration committees and the term of the members of the board of directors would significantly increase the conditions of the efficient functioning of the remuneration committees.
Technical capacity
Links may be detected between the evolutionary path, in a Portuguese law context, of the audit committee and of the remuneration committee -in the sense that in both cases those company's bodies go through three fundamental stages of evolution: exclusive composition by shareholders; the permission of inclusion of non-shareholders; and recommendations promoting the inclusion of specialists 77 .
The progressive centrality of the remuneration committees has been followed by a trend of increasing professionalization of the members. The evolution of recommendatory provisions has added to this situation. In this context, according to section II.5. 78 .
In the case of consultants in remuneration matters being included in the remuneration committee, they should have no significant ties with the company's management, to accommodate their independence (as stated in II.5.3. 79 ).
Quantitative composition
Generally, it is unadvisable for the remuneration committee to be composed by just one member -according to Portuguese law, this possibility seems not to be permitted (article 399 of the Portuguese Companies Act refers to "a committee").
Moreover, only in the cases established by the law, is it possible to form company's bodies composed by only one member (article 278, n.2 of the Portuguese Companies Act).
As a reconstitution of the reasoning of this solution, the obstacles involving company's bodies with just one member relate to the greater vulnerability to impediments of a personal nature; a greater probability of a reduction of the independence in the exercise of functions; and the no use of people with good qualifications on remuneration matters in the committee.
Apart from this, there are no established rules regarding the quantitative composition of the remuneration committee. However, regarding efficiency, it seems that there are no advantages to having a large committee. The usual trend, observed in Portugal and in most jurisdictions, is the composition of these committees standing at three members 80 .
